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Credit rating agencies are an important part of the globalized financial 
system and thus influence the global economy. Their role is to assess the 
level of credit worthiness of debt issuers for potential investors in private 
and public sector. Yet, after every financial crisis and/or defaults of 
particular companies and sovereigns, the credit rating agencies become 
the focal point of criticism by economists, politicians, media, etc. The 
reason for this lies in the inability of the credit rating agencies to do the 
job they are supposed to do i.e. risk signaling. This paper builds on that 
assessment, while focusing on three biggest credit rating agencies – 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings and 
their influences on spreading the financial crisis on the Eurozone. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
From their foundation in the middle of the nineteenth century (Henry 
Varnum Poor in 1860), Credit rating agencies (CRAs) have become an important 
factor in the financial markets. Published ratings of individual companies and 
sovereign states have far reaching consequences, taking into account the 
globalized economic relations between national economies at macro level and the 
relationship of the financial sector to real sector at the micro level. Namely, 
CRAs with their assessment of credit capabilities (risk) of borrowers or issuers of 
securities should have the role of informing potential investors. In line with 
signaled information from CRAs the investors would optimize their portfolio 
according to individual risk preferences on the basis of objective and independent 
assessment of debt repayment capacity of issuers. 
However, the events in the 1990s (Asian, Russian and Latin crises) and 
the Global crisis that began in 2007, indicate that CRAs, both at the micro level 
(the case of Enron from 2001 and the case of Lehman Brothers from 2007, both 
USA companies), and at the macro level (the case of Greece in the EU, 2010) are 
not realistic and do not provide a reliable medium-term prognosis about risk 
investment trends, what should be their primary purpose, taking into account that 
the aim of investors is to secure their investments in the long term (up to the time 
of repayment of funds by the debtor). CRAs themselves interpret ratings as 
indicators of the future state of relative level of risk that the borrower will be able 
to repay its debt on time and in full. Of course, the estimated level of risk is 
reflected in the cost of borrowing with a credit rating downgrade negatively 
correlated with movements in interest rates. 
 
 
2.  CREDIT RATING MARKET 
In 1999, there were over 150 credit rating agencies, which were reduced 
to 73, in 2009 (Pavkovic and Vedris, 2011). According to the reports of the 
European Commission, the three leading agencies, Standard & Poor's, Moody's 
Investors and Fitch Ratings hold over 94% market share of credit ratings by 
revenues. The credit rating agencies market in the USA, where, in 2003, only 
these three agencies had work permits approved by the NRSRO (National 
Recognized Statistical Ratings Organization)1, the percentage is 97% (S&P with 
42%, Moody's 37% and Fitch Ratings at 18%). This is a highly concentrated 
market due to the economy of scale as the costs of gathering and analyzing data 
represent a potential barrier to market competition. These three agencies operate 
globally in all economic sectors, whereas others specialize in particular sectors 
(e.g. DBRS, Kroll Bond Rating Agency etc.). 
                                                            
1 In 1975, when the NRSRO was established by SEC, only these three agencies had the right to assign 
credit ratings; starting with  2011, 10 CRAs have been  approved  by NRSRO  
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Table 1  








Number of issued 
sovereign states ratings 
(2011) 
S&P McGraw-Hill >6,300 >120 






Source: Official Fitch’s, S&P and Moody’s web pages; Gaillard, 2012:10 
 
The ownership of these companies is not clear cut and thus the 
overlapping of ownership should be particularly emphasized. As an 
example, the Vanguard Group is the second largest shareholder in both 
McGraw-Hill and Dun & Bradstreet (Table 1), and both companies have a 
common list of shareholders (publicly available): BlackRock Advisors 
Fund, Capital World Investors and State Street Global Advisors. Given that 
these large investors are themselves owners of the credit rating agency, 
casts doubt on their impartiality and open doubts about the possibility of 
market manipulation through privileged information. 
 
2.1.  CRA’s purpose and function 
The main function of rating agencies is to reduce the asymmetry in 
available information in regards to capital markets among the investors and 
the issuers of securities. The reduction of asymmetry is done through the 
publication of credit risk ratings, whereat the information that the investor 
seeks is published publicly. This implies that a relatively limited number of 
credit ratings is of use to a large and increasing number of investors, which 
opens possibilities for the free rider issue (using information on credit 
rating free of charge) and herd effect (a market signal, in this case the credit 
rating directs the movement of the entire market). In doing so it is necessary 
to distinguish between the asymmetry in financial markets in developed 
countries and those in developing countries, i.e. the availability of 
information on the movement of relevant macroeconomic and 
microeconomic variables for individual countries or companies. 
In case of developed countries, credit agencies have access to 
publicly available information, meaning that the assessment of credit ratings 
is issued with delay (ex post). This implies that credit agencies should not 
affect the movement in interest rates or credit default swap prices (CDS, 
which measure credit risk of sovereigns and companies) on financial 
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markets. In the second case, it is assumed that the rating agencies are able 
to generate data unavailable to the market. Such possibility is greater in 
developing countries and generally in countries with a low level of public 
finance transparency, in which the mere publication of ratings could have a 
significant impact on the price of borrowing. 
 
2.2.  CRA's costs 
Besides the credibility issue in terms of the quantitative data on the 
macroeconomic performances of sovereign states assessed by CRAs and 
especially if we consider the events during and after 2007, it is possible to 
highlight the problem of the non-transparency of fees charged by the rating 
agencies2. Namely, as the CRAs are seen as the intermediators between 
investors and issuers, it is logical that they are biased to the issuer since it is 
the issuer of securities that covers the fees for the credit risk assessment 
(which had been paid by the investors up to 1975). This change from user 
pays to issuer pays is considered another important moment, which 
contributed to reduced credibility in rating agencies). Furthermore, the 
information on the amounts charged for individual contracts is not publicly 
disclosed, i.e. the published information only provides the minimum and 
maximum fees for various issuers (types) of securities. The amount of to be 
charged as compensation fees depends on the length of the contract with the 
agency.  
 
For example, S&P has published its price framework in terms of 
calculated fees: 
1. Companies in the industrial and financial sector pay up to 0.05% of 
total value of published securities (USD 80.000 being the minimal 
value); 
2. Public finances, depending on the sector, amount, structure and 
complexity of transactions rate from USD 7,500 to 350,000 and for 
transactions exceeding USD 500 million, the fee is determined ad 
hoc; 
3. Sovereign states pay from USD 45,000 up to 200,000; 
4. Structured finances like ABS (asset backed security) or CDO 
(collateralized debt obligation) – can be charged a maximum of 
0.12% of total value; 
                                                            
2 service fees charge for credit rating is of recent date; it is considered that the bankrupcy of the U.S. 
railroad company Penn in 1970 was a turning point after which the rating agencies started charging 
fees for offered services; Cantor and Packer, 1994 
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5. For complex transactions issuers pay higher fees which are not 
publicly disclosed. 
 
2.3.  Analytical reconsideration of credit rating  
There are three types of rating elements (S&P, Moody's and Fitch): 
1. Outlook, which represents medium-term forecasts (up to 2 years), 
and can be positive (indicating a possibility of raising the rating in 
the next two years), stable (small possibility of a rating change) or 
negative (possibility of lower rating in the next two years); 
2. Credit watch (CW), is focused short-term and is carried out upon 
changes in certain macroeconomic variables that serve as the base 
for calculating the credit rating (sometimes within two working 
days of the change). Moreover, during the CW procedure (which is 
statistically usually negative) the company or sovereign has no 
credit outlook. It is necessary to mention that the launch of CW 
does not automatically carry a change in rating. The CW, in 
average, lasts about 70 days, upon which, if needed, the CRA 
publishes the new rating (Hill and Faff, 2010); 
















EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXI. (2012.) BR. 2. (639-662)              Host, A., Cvečić, I., Zaninović, V.: CREDIT... 
644 
Table 2 
Rating categories by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch 
 
 
Source: Modified by the authors according to information provided by S&P, 
Moody's and Fitch's 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXI. (2012.) BR. 2. (639-662)              Host, A., Cvečić, I., Zaninović, V.: CREDIT... 
645 
The mere process of rating is done in five steps (Kruck, 2011:26): (1) it 
begins with  the security issuer’s application (2) followed by data collection that 
is, in part, publicly available or otherwise collected through communication with 
the issuer, (3) after which the collected data undergoes quantitative and 
qualitative analyzes in accordance with the rating agency’s specific methods 
taking into account the specific features of individual countries, the global 
environment, the type, timing and the value of securities; upon theses analyses, 
(4) the agency’s committee in charge of credit rating, and composed of senior 
analysts, votes on the credit rating grade, after which, the issuer can comment on 
its rating and is given the possibility to furnish new information that may be 
relevant to the final published rating and finally, (5) once the rating is being 
published, the agency continues to follow on the issuer and if needed decides to 
raise or lower its credit rating. 
 
 
3.  ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS OF PREVIOUS 
RESEARCH ON SOVEREIGN RATINGS 
Rating agencies have sporadically cited, within the reports on rating 
criteria, several economic, social and political factors that influence the final 
rating, which implies that decisions on the assessment of credit risk is not made 
solely on the basis of objective data used to calculate the sovereign credit rating 
(Cantor and Packer, 1996). Moody's (2006) states that when calculating risk and 
credit ratings of countries they use quantitative indicators grouped as follows: 
1. Indicators of economic structure and performance of economic policy, 
such as nominal GDP, GDP per capita, real GDP, inflation, 
unemployment, economic openness, etc.; 
2. Indicators of the state in public finances, such as the ratio of income and 
expenditure of general government revenue to GDP, the total general 
government debt, the ratio of interest payments on general government 
debt to total general government revenues, etc.; 
3. Indicators of state in balance of payments and total level of indebtedness 
to foreign creditors (the level of total external debt), such as nominal and 
real exchange rate, the movement of relative prices, current account 
balance, the ratio of short-term to total external debt, etc.; 
4. Indicators of monetary developments, the foreign exposure and liquidity, 
such as movement of the M2 monetary aggregate on annual basis, the 
percentage change in the level of domestic credit, liquidity ratio 
(measured as liabilities to banks in the domestic market and total assets 
in the same bank), the level of dollarization, etc. 
As the sources of these indicators Moody's cites statistical indicators 
provided by the IMF, OECD, World Bank, Eurostat and Bank for International 
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Settlements (BIS). In calculating individual variables, the Agency reserves the 
right that the values of these variables are calculated by its own analysts based on 
the data from national sources. In view of its years long monitoring of these 
groups of indicators the Agency projects the medium-term level of credit risk. 
Moody's (2006)defines its sovereign risk analysis as ''an interdisciplinary activity 
in which the quantitative skill of the analysts must be combined with sensitivity 
to historical, political and cultural factors that do not easily lend themselves to 
qualification.”  
In econometric analyses, the most common objective (macroeconomic) 
variables (Cantor & Packer, 1996) used to prove the existence of subjective 
criteria, as well as the approximations of their impacts on the overall assessment 
of credit risk within individual agencies include the following: GDP per capita, 
annual GDP growth, inflation rate, external debt, balance of current account 
deficit, budget deficit, the country’s development level (IMF), the history of 
default. In addition to these, Ferri, Liu and Stiglitz (1999) introduced a variable 
that draws relations between the current account balance and the general 
government short-term borrowing with foreign exchange reserves. Their research 
concludes that during the Asian crisis, the rating agencies had underestimated the 
risks of some countries (Thailand, Indonesia, South Korea) prior to the crisis, and 
in the midst of a crisis overestimated the credit risk which created additional 
difficulties and lengthened the process of recovery for the mentioned national 
economies. The same could be concluded in the case of Russian and Latin 
economic crises. 
Hill and Faff (2010) conducted a study on the sample of 101 countries 
and the credit ratings by the three leading CRAs for the period 1990-2006. The 
research results were as follows: 
1. S&P is the most active agency in the times of crisis and operates as the 
primary informant in the financial markets when compared to others; 
2. There is an asymmetry in the responses to negative and positive events 
in the market, in which the lowering of the rating induce double the 
reaction in relation to the raising of the rating  (observing market indexes 
in the financial market); 
3. S&P is the rating setter in relation to other agencies for countries that are 
classified as underdeveloped according to IMF’s classification, while 
Moody's hold advantage in rating developed economies. 
Generally speaking, on the basis of the results of existing research it is 
possible to conclude the following: 
1. There are considerable differences between the credit ratings among the 
major rating agencies (the S & P and Moody's, Iyengar, 2010); 
2. The final decision on the rating of individual countries contains 
significant proportion of the subjective assessment of risk by individual 
EKON. MISAO PRAKSA DBK. GOD XXI. (2012.) BR. 2. (639-662)              Host, A., Cvečić, I., Zaninović, V.: CREDIT... 
647 
agencies. For example, econometric analysis of macroeconomic 
variables after the Asian crisis suggests overestimated ratings of 
Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia and Thailand before the crisis (up to 
1997) and underestimated rating after the crisis (after mid-1997). This 
corroborates the thesis that is often emphasized; that the rating agencies 
follow financial market trends (which brings into question the 
functionality of the agency) and contribute to the inflow of speculative 
capital in times of expansion, and outflow in times of recession and 
crisis, therefore, they act as financial market destabilizers; 
3. These agencies are more likely to lower ratings due to an increase in the 
yield difference between the benchmark bond index (Galliard, 2009; a 
conducted research in which the JP Morgan Emerging Market Bond 
Index was used as the base) and the yields on government bonds, than to 
increase them due to decrease in yield differences. 
 
Table 3  
Credit rating grades by Moody’s for Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand before, 
during and after the Asian crisis, 1997-2003 


























Source: Taken and adjusted from Langohr and Langohr, 2008:358-359  
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From the data presented in Table 3 it is obvious that the CRAs 
failed in their role as market risk ''lighthouses'' in the case of the Asian 
crisis and that the decisions to lower credit ratings were brought ex post (in 
the case of Thailand, the first devaluation was recorded in July, while the 
S&P did not lower the ratings before September). The errors in the case of 
the Asian crisis was also admitted by the mere agencies, which were 
justifying themselves saying that this crisis was marked by completely 
different features then the previous ones, because the problems of the 
private sector spilled over into the public sector (the ''error'' was repeated in 
2007, when the private companies in financial sector went bankrupt, 
creating thus structural problems in the financial and later on in the real 
sector in USA, which were then spread to the EU and the rest of the world). 
 
 
4.  CREDIT RATING AGENCIES AND THE EU 
Since 2009, the focal point of the financial crisis moved from USA 
into the European Union. The Eurozone was, and still is, the most 
vulnerable area as it is composed of countries whose economies have 
different resistance levels towards recession and the general decline in 
economic activity. Specifically, during the stability period of the global 
economy from the late 1990s until 2007, some Eurozone countries led the 
expansionary fiscal policy (with the inexistence of their own monetary 
policy, fiscal policy became the most important tool in guiding economic 
policy of the state). For example, the public debt of Greece, rose from 
103.7% to 129.3% of GDP since 2001 to 2009, with an average budget 
deficit of 7.3% of GDP during the same period (according to The Pact of 
Stability and Growth, SGP, from 1997, the budget deficit must not exceed 
3% of GDP and public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP annually, and if 
the mentioned value exceed these numbers, there ought to be a long-term 
tendency of reducing it values towards reference value). In the same period, 
the public debts of Portugal, Italy and Ireland recorded growth (51.2% to 
83%, 108.2% to 115.5%, and 35.2% to 65.2% respectively) with a budget 
deficit of approximately 4.5 %, 3.4% and 1.6% in Ireland (where in 2009 
the deficit amounted to 14.2% of GDP). At the same time, insufficient 
economic growth that had been for years pressured by a growing public debt 
(see Aizenman, Kletzer, and Pinto, 2007 about the relationship between 
economic growth and public debt) and due to rising unemployment (see 
Annex), which generally directly affects the reduction of tax revenues and 
increases expenses due to the increase in social benefits, hampered the 
possibility of debt repayment of government debt securities issued in the 
period of expansion, when the yields on securities were lower and when due 
to the lack of perception of risk liquidity was sufficient to cover all 
individual state issues. 
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From 2001 to 2011, the CRAs played a dual role in the European 
Union. Up to 2009, their credit risk ratings (e.g. Fitch rated Spain with 
AAA in the period 2003 to May 2010, although Spain has had problems 
with high unemployment and weak economic growth for many years; 
according to The Economist, in 2012 the Spanish economic growth will be 
negative and will amount to c.a. 0.8%) did not signal the creation of a new 
epicenter of financial crisis in Greece and the rest of the EU, i.e. in rating 
individual countries they did not take into account that despite structural 
economic differences, the economies of EU member states, and especially 
the Eurozone states, are strongly economically linked (as it is especially 
shown in the financial sphere and the case of Greece, where Greek debt 
creditors are mostly hard core EU countries and the Eurosystem;  
http://www.zerohedge.com/article/barclays-releases-updated-
report-top-40-greek-debt-holders) and that, by using the law of 
communicating vessels analogy, the crisis from one country will spill over 
to the rest of the Eurozone. After 2009, the CRAs reduced the ratings of 
those countries affected by the financial crisis disregarding the EU policy, 
particularly the European Council and European Central Bank efforts and 
activities (EC negotiations with creditors and the ECB purchase of Greek 
government bonds) that were aimed towards preventing the spreading of the 
crisis and thereby the preservation of the Eurozone and all its 17 states. 
 
4.1.  The Case of Greece 
Until 2009, in their reports and published ratings, the CRAs did not 
take into account the state of Greek public finances, although in 2004 
Greece admitted that the published data on the structure and condition of 
the public debt had not been realistic, namely that the data had been 
fabricated for the purpose of entering the euro area (S&P lowered the rating 
of A + to A, raising the question whether lowering the rating for one notch 
is a reasonable decision). This was justified by the positive perception of 
the market (according to Moody’s, which in 2007 changed the Greece’s 
outlook to positive). According to government data, since 2005 to 2010 
Greece paid Moody’s USD 330,000-540,000 and similar amounts were paid 
to the other two agencies as well. 
The indications of the Greek financial problems became apparent in 
January 2009, when S&P lowered their rating from A to A -. Further 
lowering by the S&P and Fitch followed in late 2009 (Greece at that time 
took USD 67 billion of loan, more than double then in 2008, at, of course, 
higher interest rates). The climax of the unrealistic CRAs decisions was for 
surly reached in June 2010, when Moody's lowered the Greece rating for 
four levels (from A3 to Ba1), classifying state bonds into the junk (garbage) 
category, just after the European Council decision to backup Greece through 
an aid package in the value of USD 147 billion (one week prior to S&P 
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lowering of ratings; Fitch did not respond prior January 2011). In June 
2011, the same scenario, after the second aid plan to help Greece Moody's 
lowered its rating to Caa1. 
Based on the Greek case, the conclusion that imposes itself (with 
empirical analysis confirmed) is that the rating agencies act pro-cyclical, 
and that in delicate moments they act opportunistic and unpredictable, thus 
worsening the situation on financial markets, indirectly reducing market 
liquidity and raising interest rates on government bonds. 
 
4.2.  Reaction of the European Union to the Credit Ratings Agencies’ 
Policies 
The EU Regulations no. 1060/2009 and 513/2011, seek to 
harmonize the rules related to credit rating agencies. These Regulations 
stipulate that economic entities in the EU may use the services only 
provided by those rating agencies that are registered with the European 
Markets and Securities Authority (ESMA). This provision has been 
weakened by two things: it allows the acceptance of ratings from agencies 
operating in a third country if they comply with the Regulation and allows 
for the use of credit ratings of entities that have not been evaluated as of 
systemic importance to financial markets of one or more Member states. As 
of 2012 there are 29 registered rating agencies 
(http://www.esma.europa.eu/page/List-registered-and-certified-CRAs#). 
The Regulations are aimed at improving the quality of credit ratings 
by determining the general principles in terms of the methodology used to 
determine the ratings, avoiding conflicts of interest through a series of 
organizational and operational requirements, increasing transparency of 
credit agencies (registered in the EU) and the publishing of rating 
methodologies. Upon the proposal, (1) the rating agencies will have to 
rotate, that is, one company will be assessed by several rating agencies over 
a longer period of time, (2) rating agencies will have to take responsibility 
for the assigned rating, (3) the regulator (ESMA) will be able to interfere in 
the way of supervising agency operations through the imposition of 
standardized rating scale, definitions and methodologies, and (4) will 
prohibit the assigning of ratings to those agencies in which individual 
shareholders hold more than 10% of ownership and who are, at the same 
time, members of administrative and management bodies in  companies 
under evaluation. Agencies are also required to submit annual reports to 
ESMA. Sanctions are stipulated in the form of prohibiting activities if the 
agency does not comply with the provisions stipulated by the Regulations. 
In 2012, within the context of realization of the provisions 
specified by the Regulations, ESMA aims to (ESMA, 2011:3): 
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1. Introduce and implement uniform rules on EU financial markets, 
initiated by the EU institutions in response to the financial crisis; 
2. Fully implement its oversight of rating agencies in the EU; 
3. Coordinate, monitor and analyze financial markets, and develop and 
coordinate relationships between the relevant national and 
supranational EU bodies; 
4. Achieve active cooperation at global level, between the rating 
agencies of third countries for the purposes of harmonizing the 
regulation of CRAs’ activities. 
 
 
5.  ANALYSIS OF CREDIT RATINGS OF PIIGS  
COUNTRIES 
Due to the fact that the leading rating agencies, in the case of EU 
countries, have placed too much weight on the subjective assessments of 
risk in which they have underestimated the macroeconomic indicators, 
especially after 2007 and the beginning of the financial crisis in the USA, 
this paper continues by presenting the results of the econometric analysis 
with purpose of connecting credit ratings to selected macroeconomic 
variables. Namely, under the conditions of globalized economic relations 
and especially bearing in mind the economic importance of trade relations 
between the U.S. and the EU (more than 30% of world trade in goods and 
services 40%; http://eurunion.org/eu/Table/EU- -US Relations /), it was 
logical to expect that the crisis to spill over European countries. Forecasts 
were fulfilled in 2008 and 2009, during which the Southeast European 
countries were particularly affected, as well as those countries within the 
euro area which were marked by chronic political and economic instability - 
the PIIGS countries. Taking into account the primary objective of credit 
rating agencies, it was expected that the increased risks of certain countries 
will be expressed quantitatively through the reduced credit ratings prior to, 
and not after, entering recession (decrease in the rate of economic growth 
for two consecutive quarters). 
The unofficial acronym PIIGS stands for Portugal, Italy, Ireland, 
Greece and Spain, countries that, from the 1990s onwards (Ireland joined 
the group during the financial crises which started in 2007) have had 
troubles keeping a stable economic (fiscal, and monetary policy until the 
accession to the EMU) policy. The aim of the econometric analysis of the 
macroeconomic variables of these countries is to prove whether there is a 
causal connection between the movement of certain macroeconomic 
variables and the change of the credit ratings of selected countries (that is, 
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whether the selected macroeconomic variables can explain the movement of 
the country's credit rating). 
The results of the multiple linear regression3 in which the credit 
rating is a dependent variable are presented in continuation. For the 
purposes of regression analysis, the linear conversion of characters into 
numerical rating label values was performed (see Table 2, the optimal score, 
the AAA rating is indicated by number 25, AA +, 24 and analogous to D, 
1). In order to test the potential effect of how certain macroeconomic 
variables4 influence the movement of credit ratings, four independent 
variables were selected: the movement of real gross domestic product per 
year (in %, compared to the previous year), unemployment (in %, annual 
average) state budget deficit relative to GDP (in %) and the movement of 
public debt (in %). What follows is brief explanation of the reasons for the 
selection of individual independent variables. 
The growth of real GDP is a key indicator of a country’s economic 
situation. The optimal growth of the parameter (different for each country 
and conditioned by other macroeconomic indicators such as unemployment 
and external indebtedness) denotes the capacity of the economy to employ a 
growing workforce, thus decreasing the unemployment rate and indicates 
the growth of the living standard. 
The unemployment rate is an indicator of the level of utilization of 
human resources; if the unemployment rate is higher than the natural rate of 
unemployment there is a tendency of leading an expansionary fiscal and 
monetary policy (in the case of the euro area, the monetary policy is 
conducted exclusively by the ECB). Furthermore, if the unemployment rate 
shows a relatively high growth (see Annex, Table 10, for example, an 
increase in the unemployment rate in Ireland and Spain between 2007 and 
2008 of approximately 27%), due to the influence of the growing mass of 
unemployed, the pressure on governments of these countries will increase, 
particularly in terms of the requirement for increased spending for the 
unemployed and for stimulating investment cycles, which, due to the 
reduction of foreign direct investment as a result of the global economic 
crisis, results in increased state budget, i.e. increased budget deficit. 
Public debt of general government, as a state of accumulated public 
sector indebtedness, results from the previous conduction of fiscal policy 
and indicates the particular country’s preference/aversion to borrowing. 
High levels of public debt (in the case of the Eurozone, over 60% of GDP), 
and the tendency of rapid growth of the same, should present a negative 
signal to rating agencies, particularly in the case of the global economic 
                                                            
3 for calculation was used program SPSS Statistics 20 
4 all data was taken from: http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/eurostat/home/ 
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crisis. For the PIIGS countries, in addition to high public debt, there is also 
a characteristic dependence on foreign borrowing (86% of Irish, 95% Greek, 
95% Spanish and 105% of Portuguese public debt is owed to foreign 
creditors; Sinn, 2012). 
The budget deficit, defined as an exceed of expenditures over 
revenues in a budget period, represents a need for short-term government 
borrowing (or the sale of national assets) and indicates further accumulation 
of public debt, increasing the likelihood of eventual refinancing, which in 
times of contraction of national economy and economies in surrounding, 
makes it harder to timely repay debt. 
The data were taken for the 2001 to 2010 period, in which the last 
published rating for a particular year by Fitch Ratings5 was taken as the 
value of credit rating and the value of previous years was taken, if there was 
no change in the rating in a particular year. It is normal to assume that the 
rate of real GDP growth will have a positive sign, whereas other 












B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 29.776 1.750 17.011 .000
GDP growth .056 .077 .133 .727 .500
Unemployment -.287 .086 -.275 -3.352 .020
Deficit -.006 .055 -.015 -.113 .914
Public debt -.069 .016 -,741 -4.356 .007
a. Dependent Variable: Rating 
 
The results of the regression analysis (F value 57.294, adjusted 
coefficient of determination is 0.962, value of Durbin Watson test is 1.939 
which indicates no autocorrelation, coefficient correlations indicate no 
multicollinearity and the heteroskedasticity is not present – graphical 
method) for Greece indicate that only two independent variables 
(unemployment and public debt) are significant in explaining the dependent 
variable. The parameter with a variable deficit of -0.006 indicates that the 
deficit does not significantly affect the rating change, which, if we consider 
                                                            
5 ratings taken from: http://www.fitch.com 
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the statistical data from 2001 to 2010, indicates that according to the Fitch 
agency standards, the long-term deficit at an average of over 7.6% of GDP 
from 2001 to 2010, in addition to the average unemployment rate of 9.8% is 
not a sufficient reason for the lower rating from grade A (high stability of 
payment, see Table 2). In addition, Greece's entry into the Eurozone in 2001 
was accompanied with the problems concerning budget data (in 2004 
Greece revised budget deficit from 1.7 to 4.6% of GDP); yet, since 2004 to 
2009, the credit rating remained unchanged. A partial justification for the 
Agency’s decision can be found in the fact that the expectations of financial 
markets in terms of public finances were positive for several reasons - 
Greece is a member of the Eurozone, which assumes a gradual convergence 
in the economic area towards developed EU countries - the countries of the 
solid core (this assumption turned out to be wrong - the two-speed Europe); 
and the assumption of the necessity of implementing structural reforms due 











B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 29.589 .720 41.120 .000
Public debt -.040 .021 -.380 -1.923 .112
Unemployment -.526 .083 -.800 -6.340 .001
Deficit .023 .040 .107 .571 .593
GDP growth -.222 .025 -.425 -8.881 ,000
a. Dependent Variable: Rating 
 
In the case of Ireland (F value of 338.470, adjusted coefficient of 
determination amounts to 0.993, value of Durbin Watson test is 2. which 
indicates no autocorrelation, coefficient correlations indicate no 
multicollinearity and the heteroskedasticity is not present – graphical 
method)) the variables of unemployment and GDP growth show to be 
statistically significant variables, in which the coefficient sign is not in line 
with expectations. The reason for the unexpected sign lie in the relatively 
high rates of growth of the Irish economy in the period 2001 to 2007 during 
which Ireland was assigned the AAA grade by the Fitch agency. In 2008 
Ireland's economy fell into recession (real GDP declined for 3%), but it 
continued to have the   AAA rating with stable outlook until March 2009. 
Thus, failure to recognize structural problems in the Irish economy led to 
the inability of a reliable assessment of the dependent variable. 
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For Portugal, Spain and Italy (respectively Tables 11, 12 and 13 in 
the Annex), no independent variable was statistically significant. This may 
be explained by the alarmingly insufficient basing of the Fitch Rating 
agency on quantitative indicators. Namely, in terms of Portugal, whose 
economy was characterized, from 2005, by a high current account deficit in 
the balance of payments (up to 2010, on average higher than 10% according 
to Eurostat sources) and in addition to Annex information, it is evident that 
the movement of selected macroeconomic variables is not consistent with 
the Fitch’s AA rating, which is only two ratings lower than the optimal 
long-term risk rating. 
The public debt of Italy, since the introduction of Euro has been 
among the highest in the European Union and, since 2001, it is above 100% 
of GDP; the budget deficit in the same period (up to 2010) was over 3%, 
while the rate of economic growth, expressed by the real GDP growth rate,  
was 0.41%). These data indicate the potential instability of the country in 
case of a large-scale economic crisis. However, up to mid 2011, the Fitch 
Agency held the Italian outlook stable despite the negative economic as 
well as political events in the country (political and economic problems 
particularly emerged by the end of 2011). 
Spain, as a country with chronic unemployment (from 2001, 
unemployment was higher than 10%) and an unstable fiscal policy, was 
assigned the AAA rating from 2003 to 2010, which meant that the risk of 
credit default for Spain was identical to that of Germany, economically the 




6.  CONCLUSION 
The controversy of rating agencies is confirmed by this research. 
The main task of rating agencies to predict the debtors’ ability to repay 
public and private debt in due time in the past 20 years has not been 
fulfilled. The Asian, Russian and Latin crisis, as well as the crisis that 
began in 2007, were not anticipated by the rating agencies. This brings into 
question the functionality of their existence, since numerous econometric 
analyses revealed serious deficiencies in the foundations of individual states 
credit ratings. The reason for this crucial deficiency of rating agencies most 
probably lies in the over-weighting of subjective factors when awarding 
credit rating. In addition, rating agencies are typically late with the lowering 
of ratings and they ignore numerous macroeconomic signals. The moment 
they decide to lower ratings, they act as an element of panic, instead of 
acting as an element of calming the market through the prediction of 
economic movements. 
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In all cases, rating agencies disclaim any responsibility for the 
damages caused to the state or the investors. For all these reasons, the 
optimal solution can be in the founding of public agencies that would assess 
credit ratings and that would be financially and organizationally 
independent of the investors and/or issuers of securities, and/or in the 
publishing of a comprehensive and unique methodology for awarding credit 
ratings. However, the lucrativeness of this business activity as well as the 
ownership-interest interrelation with private investors ensures that the 
rating agencies will continue to be for a long time the market makers. 
Furthermore, this will enable their owners to keep in their hands a powerful 
instrument of market manipulation and a very likely privileged access to 
information. Moreover, what is especially dangerous is that most likely, 
despite all EU efforts, the agencies will continue to operate under the same 
rules and with no consequences to their own credibility and their own 
income. 
The current economic crisis has just strengthened the need for an 
effective supervision and oversight of global financial markets. Rating 
agencies are just an element of the system that will, without effective 
supervision and without legal responsibility certainly create the conditions 
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Table 6  
Growth of real GDP 2001 - 2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greece 4.2 3.4 5.9 4.4 2.3 5.5 3 -0.2 -3.3 -3.5 
Ireland 4.8 5.9 4.2 4.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 -3 -7 -0.4 
Spain 3.7 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 4.1 3.5 0.9 -3.7 -0.1 
Italy 1.9 0.5 0 1.7 0.9 2.2 1.7 -1.2 -5.1 1.5 
Portugal 2 0.8 -0.9 1.6 0.8 1.4 2.4 0 -2.9 1.4 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 
 
Table 7  
Rate of unemployment 2001 - 2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greece 3.9 4.5 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6 6.3 11.9 13.7 
Ireland 10.7 10.3 9.7 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 7.7 9.5 12.6 
Spain 10.3 11.1 11.1 10.6 9.2 8.5 8.3 11.3 18.0 20.1 
Italy 9.1 8.6 8.4 8.0 7.7 6.8 6.1 6.7 7.8 8.4 
Portugal 4.6 5.7 7.1 7.5 8.6 8.6 8.9 8.5 10.6 12.0 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 
 
Table 8  
Budget deficit 2001 - 2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greece 0.9 -0.4 0.4 1.4 1.7 2.9 0.1 -7.3 -14.2 -31.3 
Ireland -4.5 -4.8 -5.6 -7.5 -5.2 -5.7 -6.5 -9.8 -15.8 -10.6 
Spain -0.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 1.3 2.4 1.9 -4.5 -11.2 -9.3 
Italy -3.1 -3.1 -3.6 -3.5 -4.4 -3.4 -1.6 -2.7 -5.4 -4.6 
Portugal 
-4.3 -2.9 -3.0 -3.4 -5.9 -4.1 -3.1 -3.6 -10.1 -9.8 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 
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Table 9  
Public deficit 2001 - 2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greece 35.2 31.9 30.7 29.4 27.2 24.7 24.8 44.2 65.2 92.5 
Ireland 103.7 101.7 97.4 98.6 100.0 106.1 107.4 113.0 129.3 144.9 
Spain 55.6 52.6 48.8 46.3 43.1 39.6 36.2 40.1 53.8 61.0 
Italy 108.2 105.1 103.9 103.4 105.4 106.1 103.1 105.8 115.5 118.4 
Portugal 51.2 53.8 55.9 57.6 62.8 63.9 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.3 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 
 
Table 10 
Linear conversion of Fitch agency’s credit rating grades 2001 - 2010 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Greece 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25 25.0 22.0 18.0 
Ireland 20.0 20.0 21.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 20 20.0 18.0 16.0 
Spain 24.0 24.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25 25.0 25.0 24.0 
Italy 22.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 22.0 22 22.0 22.0 22.0 
Portugal 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23.0 23 23.0 23.0 21.0 
 
Source: Eurostat, 2012 
 
Table 11  
Portugal 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 25.287 1.090  23.189 .000 
Public debt -.043 .041 -.919 -1.053 .341 
Unemployment .110 .215 .375 .510 .632 
Deficit .079 .108 .345 .738 .494 
GDP growth -.193 .109 -.481 -1.778 .136 
a. Dependent Variable: Rating 
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Table 12  
Spain 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 27.364 .980  27.936 .000 
Public debt -.057 .026 -.953 -2.188 .080 
Unemployment .045 .128 .373 .355 .737 
Deficit .070 .161 .688 .436 .681 
GDP growth -.152 .202 -.769 -.755 .484 
a. Dependent Variable: Rating 
 
 
Table 13  
Italy 
Coefficientsa 
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
1 
(Constant) 30.071 4.514  6.662 .001 
Public debt -.087 .046 -.868 -1.914 .114 
Unemployment .164 .189 .297 .872 .423 
Deficit -.158 .172 -.440 -.917 .401 
GDP growth .044 .091 .183 .482 .650 
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AGENCIJE ZA KREDITNI REJTING I NJIHOV 




Agencije za kreditni rejting su važni dio globaliziranog financijskog sustava, te 
stoga i utječu na globalnu ekonomiju. Njihova uloga je procijeniti razinu boniteta 
emitenta duga za potencijalne investitore u privatnom i javnom sektoru. Ipak, 
nakon svake financijske krize i/ili neispunjenja ugovornih obveza određenih tvrtki 
i suverenih država, agencije za kreditni rejting postaju žarište kritike ekonomista, 
političara, medija, i td. Razlog tomu leži u nesposobnosti agencija za kreditni 
rejting da obavljaju svoj posao, a to je upozoravanje na rizike. Ovaj rad se 
temelji na toj ocjeni, s naglaskom na tri najveće agencije za kreditni rejting – 
Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors Service and Fitch Ratings, i njihovim 
utjecajem na širenje financijske krize u Eurozoni.   
Ključne riječi: agencije za kreditni rejting, financijska kriza, Eurozona, PIIGS 
JEL klasifikacija: G01, G11, G20, F40 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
